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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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Ms. 90:036

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SUBJECT: U.S. Proposal for Canadian Concurrence to Increase Operational Readiness of NORAD Forces in Event Western Powers are Denied Access to Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador A.D.P. Heeney, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Saul Rae, Minister, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Jim Nutt, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Foy Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. Ivan White, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. W. Willoughby, Director, BNA
Mr. James P. Parker, BNA

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Ambassador Heeney called at his request to discuss at further length the U.S. proposal for Canadian concurrence to increase the operational readiness of NORAD forces in the event access to Berlin is denied the Western Powers. He said that the Canadian Government found the U.S. proposal reasonable and proper but before replying formally he wished to discuss the matter of determining when "denial of access" had occurred. He wondered whether we could define more precisely what would constitute a "denial of access".

Mr. Kohler said that no definite definition for this term had been worked out as yet. He recalled that the original directive on contingency planning had been worked out during the Macmillan visit to Washington in March and that this directive had been later approved by the French and now governed the basis for current Tripartite contingency planning. This directive stated essentially as follows with regard to contingency planning for Berlin:

1. The three Powers will plan

(a) Quiet precautionary measures which will not create public alarm but will be detectable by Soviet intelligence, such measures to be implemented as soon as agreed.

(b) More elaborate measures which will be observable including
(1) measures to be implemented after the Soviets have turned over their
function to the D.D.R. and (2) measures to be implemented after our traffic
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2. The allied Embassies in Bonn in cooperation with the allied military authorities will draft instructions to commanders of military convoys, vehicles and trains as to procedures they will follow in the event of D.D.R. personnel replacing Soviet personnel at check points (a) if the Soviets declare them to be their agents and (b) if they do not. In the latter event commanders will not submit to formalities and measures by D.D.R. personnel going beyond what is necessary to enable them to identify convoys, vehicles or trains as belonging to Allied forces or going beyond what may be tripartitely agreed to be reasonable to enable D.D.R. personnel to ensure the orderly progress of traffic on the autobahn or railroad.

Mr. Kohler said that the planning was being carried out in three operations: (a) the Tripartite UN delegations were planning steps to be taken in the UN, (b) General Norstad headed a Tripartite Military Group in Paris which was planning military measures and (c) the Allied Embassies in Bonn were working on plans to guide commanders of convoys, vehicles and trains. As we see it, NORAD planning must be related to and coordinated with General Norstad's planning and this will be accomplished through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the political level the planning of the Norstad Group when completed will be referred to the NATO Governments and at this point the Canadian Government will be able to comment on the military measures planned for each stage.

Ambassador Heeney asked whether the U.S. proposal for putting NORAD on increased operational readiness fitted into the planning under subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph 1 of the directive cited by Mr. Kohler. Mr. Kohler said that in the terms in which it was proposed to take such action (i.e., in the event of denial of access to Berlin), the proposal fits into the planning under subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of the directive. However, we would not wish to preclude the possibility of our governments wishing to include NORAD readiness measures in the planning under subparagraph (a).

Ambassador Heeney said that he wished to emphasize again that the Canadian Government found the U.S. proposal to be acceptable in principle but that it would wish to decide with the U.S. Government when "denial of access" had occurred. The only thing therefore that remained was that both governments reach agreement on the conditions which would constitute a "denial of access".

Mr. Kohler said that these conditions are being determined in the current contingency planning and that the Canadian Government would be kept fully informed as the plans are developed.

Ambassador Heeney said it would be helpful in clarifying to Ottawa the matter of "denial of access" if he could obtain a copy of the directive

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on contingency planning agreed at the Macmillan talks and cited by Mr. Kohler. Mr. Kohler said he would be pleased to furnish Ambassador Heeney with a copy of the pertinent portions of the directive as cited above.

Mr. Rae then read a draft aide-memoire which represented preliminary thinking of the Canadian Government on the U.S. proposal. Mr. Kohler noted that while the draft expressed the Canadian Government's approval of the U.S. proposal it contained language expressing the need for further consultation between governments after denial of access to Berlin has occurred in order to determine whether conditions warranted increasing the operational readiness of NCRAD. Mr. Kohler said that a prime purpose of contingency planning was to define conditions and outline military readiness measures to be taken ahead of time so that our military commanders will be free to take planned military readiness measures as predefined conditions are fulfilled without the necessity for further consultation.

Ambassador Heeney said that he did not think there would be any problem in revising the draft in a suitable manner to fit in with current Tripartite contingency planning and he thanked Mr. Kohler for his clarifying comments on the question of "denial of access".

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